The AU Convention on Refugees and the Concept of Asylum by d\u27Orsi, Cristiano
Pace University
DigitalCommons@Pace
Pace International Law Review Online Companion School of Law
7-1-2012
The AU Convention on Refugees and the Concept
of Asylum
Cristiano d'Orsi
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, cd6jx@virginia.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilronline
Part of the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace
International Law Review Online Companion by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact
cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Cristiano d’Orsi, The AU Convention on Refugees and the Concept of Asylum, 3 Pace Int’l L. Rev. Online Companion 220 (2012).
  
220 
 
PACE UNIVERSITY 
SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
PACE INTERNATIONAL  
LAW REVIEW 
ONLINE COMPANION 
 
Volume 3, Number 7 July 2012 
 
THE AU CONVENTION ON REFUGEES 
AND THE CONCEPT OF ASYLUM 
 
Cristiano d’Orsi* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
* Cristiano d’Orsi is a Ph.D. candidate in International Law at the Grad-
uate Institute of International and Development Studies (GIIDS) in Geneva, 
Switzerland. He would like to thank Dr. Alice Edwards, Senior Legal Coordi-
nator, Division of International Protection, at the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Geneva for the very useful com-
ments made to the previous drafts of this work, as well as Mrs. Ling Perrelet 
and Mr. Caleb Stevens for their precious advice and edits. All errors, howev-
er, are exclusively the author’s. Cristiano would like to dedicate this article to 
Anna simply because he loves her. Cristiano can be contacted at Cris-
tiano.Dorsi@graduateinstitute.ch or cd6jx@virginia.edu. 
2012] AU CONVENTION ON REFUGEES 221 
I. THE FIGURES ILLUSTRATING THE PRESENT REFUGEE 
SITUATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
At the end of 2010, within the regions of responsibility of 
the UNHCR Bureau for Africa (Central Africa-Great Lakes, 
East and Horn of Africa, Southern Africa and Western Africa) 
the number of refugees and people in a refugee-like situation 
amounted to 2,184,000 compared to 2,074,800 of the beginning 
of the same year.1  This increase was evidently due to the esca-
lation of violence in several countries, notably in Central Afri-
can Republic (“CAR”), Democratic Republic of Congo (“DRC”) 
and Somalia, and to the conflict that broke out in Cote d’Ivoire, 
which caused the outflow of 21,000 potential asylum-seekers to 
DRC, 18,100 to Liberia and 4,000 to Uganda.2 
In the same period, many forcedly displaced people in Sub-
Saharan Africa (“SSA”) fled their native countries for neigh-
bouring countries.  For instance, in that period, Kenya had an 
influx 402,900 refugees, mainly from Somalia while Chad saw 
an influx of 347,900 refugees, mainly from CAR and Sudan.  
The ten major source countries in 2010 included Somalia, with 
770,200 individuals, the DRC, with 476,700 refugees, Sudan, 
with 387,200 persons and Eritrea, with 222,500 nationals hav-
ing obtained asylum elsewhere.3      
This article analyzes several specific aspects of the current 
refugee legal regime in SSA in order to assess how the institu-
tion of asylum, considered the traditional solution for both in-
dividuals and groups who are obliged to flee their countries of 
citizenship,4 is legally perceived and applied.  The analysis will 
focus on the 1969 African Union Convention Governing the 
                                                 
1 UNHCR, UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2010 65 (2011). 
2 Id. (explaining that the category of people in a refugee-like situation is 
“[d]escriptive in nature and includes groups of persons who are outside their 
country or territory of origin and who face protection risks similar to those of 
refugees, but for whom refugee status has, for practical or other reasons, not 
been ascertained.”).  
3 UNHCR, UNHCR Global Trends 2010 12-15 (2011) (“The number of 
Sudanese refugees has decreased for five consecutive years following the re-
turn of hundreds of thousands of refugees from neighbouring countries to 
South Sudan.  However, in 2010 the numbers of Sudanese refugees increased 
by some 19,000 people compared to 2009, mainly due to the volatile situation 
in Darfur and Southern Sudan.”).  
4 See generally MOHAMED BEDJAOUI, L’ASILE EN AFRIQUE 26-27 (1979) 
(creating a detailed, historical excursus to show the longstanding tradition of 
asylum in Sub-Saharan Africa).      
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Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa,5 the pillar for 
refugee protection in SSA and “considered the most generous 
and flexible international agreement on refugee protection.”6  
Excluded from this analysis are North African countries 
and Maghreb countries, for a couple of reasons.  First, histori-
cally and anthropologically, the inhabitants of Morocco, Alge-
ria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt perceive themselves to be more 
Arab than African, as they are ethnically and culturally closer 
to the Islamic peoples of the Near and Middle East than to the 
African peoples of SSA.7  Second, in general, few Africans apply 
for asylum in Maghreb countries, a recent exception being the 
Sudanese and Eritrean refugees entering Egypt,8 where at the 
end of 2010, Egypt hosted on its territory 6,172 Somali and 
10,035 Sudanese refugees.9  Conversely, citizens of Maghreb 
countries rarely apply for asylum in SSA countries, preferring 
to seek refuge in countries outside of Africa.10  Nevertheless, 
2011 data is not yet available, but it may not follow this trend 
given the popular revolutions in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia.  
                                                 
5 African Union Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee 
Problems in Africa, adopted Sept. 10, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 1288 (entered into force 
June 20, 1974) [hereinafter “1969 AU Convention”]. 
6 Interview by Fatoumata Lejeune-Kaba with George Okoth-Obbo, Afr. 
Bureau Dir., United Nations High Comm’r for Refugees (Sept. 9, 2009), 
available at http://unhcr.org/4aa7b80c6.html. 
7 Philip K. Hitti, History of Arabs: From the Earliest Times to the Pre-
sent 160-68 (10th ed. 2002).   
8 See Egypt: Stop Deporting Eritrean Asylum Seekers, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH (Jan. 8, 2009), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/01/08/egypt-stop-
deporting-eritrean-asylum-seekers (“Egypt has forcibly returned home more 
than 45 Eritrean migrants on several flights in the past two weeks without 
first providing the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) the re-
quired opportunity to interview them. ‘Eritreans are fleeing a repressive gov-
ernment with a terrible human rights record and need protection, not further 
abuse,’ said Joe Stork, deputy director of Human Rights Watch’s Middle East 
and North Africa division.  ‘Instead of forcing them onto flights, Egypt should 
give UNHCR immediate access to identify Eritrean migrants with refugee 
claims.’”). 
9 UNHCR, Statistical Yearbook 2010, Geneva: UNHCR, October 2011, 
Table 5, at 80-81.  
10 See, e.g., Frequently Requested Statistics, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr. 
org/pages/4a0174156.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2009) (revealing that, in 2008, 
only one Moroccan citizen applied for asylum in Sub-Saharan Africa (in Mau-
ritania), sixteen Algerians (1 in Angola, two in Benin, one in Botswana, one 
in Cameroon, one in Liberia, one in Mali, nine in Senegal), two from Tunisia 
(both in Mauritania), one from Libya (in Nigeria), and one Egyptian (out of 
4,775 Egyptian asylum seekers over the world) applied for asylum in South 
Africa).  
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The African Convention, adopted in 1969 by the former 
Organization of the African Unity,11 entered into force on June 
20, 1974,12  constitutes a legal reference for states, internation-
al and regional organizations, as well as NGOs and humanitar-
ian operators working in SSA.  To date, forty-five countries in 
SSA have ratified the Convention.13  The exceptions are Djibou-
ti (which signed in 2005),14 Eritrea,15 Madagascar (which 
                                                 
11 Nsongurua J. Udombana, The Institutional Structure of the African 
Union: A Legal Analysis, 33 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 69, 71-72 (2002) (“[O]n July 11, 
2000, the OAU adopted the Constitutive Act of the African Union (‘AU Act’) 
to replace the OAU Charter.  The AU Act, which established the African Un-
ion (AU), was ratified with asthmatic breathlessness and entered into force 
on May 26, 2001, less than one year after its adoption. . . . The OAU was for-
mally dissolved on July 9, 2002, during the last (38th) ordinary session of the 
OAU Assembly in Durban, South Africa.  The AU was formally launched dur-
ing the same period, holding its first session between July 9 and July 10, 
2002, also in Durban, South Africa.  With the launching of the AU, the OAU 
ceased to be an umbrella international organization for collective Africa.”). 
12 1969 AU Convention supra note 5. 
13 List of Countries Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the OAU 
Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, 
AFRICA-UNION.ORG (Nov. 11, 2009), http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/do 
cuments/treaties/text/refugee%20Problems%20in%20bAfrica.doc.  
14 See UNHCR, 2012 Regional Operations Profile – Djibouti (2012), 
available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e483836 
(“UNHCR and the Government of Djibouti are working to ensure that Somali 
refugees, most of whom are recognized on a prima facie basis, are duly regis-
tered. Non-Somali (mostly Eritrean and Ethiopian) asylum-seekers will be 
given access to refugee status determination (RSD) procedures with the reac-
tivation of the National Commission for Eligibility.  UNHCR will work closely 
with the authorities to revive the Commission.  UNHCR will continue regis-
tering Somali refugees at the Loyada border, where there is a reception cen-
tre.  A total of 400 people from Ethiopia and Eritrea will be considered for 
RSD. To keep an effective cooperation with national authorities, regular 
training and capacity-building workshops need to be carried out for law-
enforcement officials and border guards.”). 
15 AMNESTY INT’L, ANNUAL REPORT 2009: THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S 
HUMAN RIGHTS 140 (2009) (“Egypt, Sudan, Germany, Sweden and the UK 
forcibly returned Eritrean refugees and asylum-seekers from November 2007 
onwards.  These forced returns disregarded the fate of earlier returnees who 
had been arbitrarily detained and tortured, and ignored UNHCR guidelines 
which strongly recommend against any forced returns to Eritrea because of 
Eritrea’s poor human rights record.”) [hereinafter THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S 
HUMAN RIGHTS]; see also UNHCR, 2012 Regional Operations Profile - East 
and Horn of Africa. Eritrea (2012), available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e4838e6 (“People of concern to UNHCR in Eritrea 
are mainly Somali, Sudanese and Ethiopian asylum-seekers and refugees.  
The Government of Eritrea recognizes Somali and Sudanese refugees on a 
prima facie basis, while Ethiopians are recognized by UNHCR Eritrea under 
its mandate.  The Somali and Sudanese refugees are camp-based and reside 
224      PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE COMPANION [Vol.  3::5 
signed in 1969), Mauritius,16 Namibia (which signed in 2009),17 
San Tomé and Principe, and Somalia (which signed in 1969).18 
                                                                                                             
in Emkulu and Elit camps, respectively.  Most Ethiopian refugees reside in 
the capital, Asmara.  It is not foreseen that return will be possible for the 
Somali or the Ethiopian refugees.  In the case of the Sudanese, however, a 
return could be envisaged. Since local integration is not an option, resettle-
ment remains the main durable solution.  To date, a total of 165 Somali, 
Ethiopian and Sudanese refugees have been resettled in third countries.  The 
main operational objectives and priorities of UNHCR Eritrea in 2012 and 
2013 will continue to focus on providing international protection and seeking 
durable solutions for Somali, Sudanese and Ethiopian asylum-seekers and 
refugees, as well as providing care and maintenance to camp-based Somali 
and Sudanese refugees and urban-based Ethiopian refugees.”). 
16 See UNHCR, 2012 Regional Operations Profile - Southern Africa. 
Madagascar (2012)  available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page 
?page=49e485626&submit=GO (“A small number of refugees and asylum-
seekers in the Indian Ocean island States of Comoros, Madagascar, Mauri-
tius and the Seychelles will receive assistance from UNDP under a Memo-
randum of Understanding with UNHCR.  The well-being of persons of con-
cern will be assessed through regular UNHCR monitoring visits. In 
Madagascar, UNHCR is working with the Government to identify and devel-
op a strategy that will address the emerging issue of statelessness.”).  
17 The case of Namibia is unique because it has addressed the refugee 
situation through the promulgation of domestic law.  See The Refugees 
(Recognition and Control) Act (1999) (Namib.); see also John Baloro, The Law 
and Pattern of the Repatriation of Namibian and South African Refugees: 
Possible Lessons for a Programme of Repatriation of Mozambican Refugees, 
28 COMP. & INT’L L.J. S. AFR. 113 (1995) (discussing the situation of refugees 
in Namibia).  Namibia also engaged in several agreements with the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. See Agreement on the Establish-
ment of a Commission for the Promotion of Voluntary Repatriation of Ango-
lan Refugees between the Government of the Republic of Angola, the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of Namibia, and the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, Angl.-Namib.-UNHCR, June 14, 1995, available 
at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3edef5c24.html; Agreement on the Es-
tablishment of a Tripartite Commission for the Voluntary Repatriation of 
Angolan Refugees between the Government of the Republic of Angola, the 
Government of the Republic of Namibia and the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees, Angl.-Namib.-UNHCR, Nov. 8, 2002, available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/447d8dca4.html.  See generally UNHCR, 
2012 Regional Operations Profile - Southern Africa. Namibia (2012) available 
at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e48588a7b&submit=G 
O (“Namibia hosts some 8,700 refugees and asylum-seekers, mainly from An-
gola and the DRC.  More than 7,400 live in Osire refugee settlement. UNHCR 
will continue to advocate for local integration as the most appropriate solu-
tion for the Angolan refugees who have been in the country for nearly 20 
years, as well as voluntary repatriation.  RSD, health and education services 
for the refugees have been integrated into the work of government line minis-
tries.  UNHCR will provide technical support and assistance to ensure that 
protection and assistance meet international standards.”).  
18 UNHCR, UNHCR’s Position on the Return of Rejected Asylum-Seekers 
to Somalia 2 (2004) (“Throughout [Somalia], human rights violations remain 
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II. THE CORE QUESTION: THE IMPORTANCE OF ASYLUM AND 
THE PROBLEMS OF RECOGNITION 
Asylum is important because it represents an institution 
through which human personality and values can be protected.  
At the same time, it has often broad implications in interna-
tional relations and can disturb interstate relations.19  Asylum 
is the protection given by the state to an individual or to a 
group of individuals “by letting him enter the territory the 
state and allowing him to stay within it.”20 
The right to seek and enjoy freedom from persecution does 
not find expression in the two main, universally-binding in-
struments applicable to SSA: the 1951 Geneva Convention Re-
lating to the Status of Refugees21 and its 1967 New York Proto-
col.  Nor is the right to asylum mentioned in the 1950 United 
                                                                                                             
endemic.  These include murder, looting and destruction of property, use of 
child soldiers, kidnapping, discrimination of minorities, torture, unlawful ar-
rest and detention, and denial of due process by local authorities. In 2003, a 
local human rights organization, the Isma’il Jimale Human Rights Centre, 
documented 530 civilian deaths in armed conflicts between July 2002 and 
June 2003. . . . In July 2003, the targeting of young girls for rape and killing 
was prominent in clan disputes in Baidoa, and kidnappings in Mogadishu 
reached such alarming proportions that the public took to the streets to pro-
test.  Gender-based violence is prevalent, including rape, female genital muti-
lation and domestic violence.  The cultural attitudes of traditional elders and 
law enforcement officials routinely result in restrictions on women’s access to 
justice, denial of their right to due process and their inhumane treatment in 
detention.  The prolonged absence of a central government complicates efforts 
to address the human rights violations.”); THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S HUMAN 
RIGHTS, supra note 15, at 294 (“The interlinked human rights and humani-
tarian crises continued to worsen in 2008.  Thousands more civilians were 
killed, bringing the total number of civilians killed as a result of armed con-
flict since January 2007 to more than 16,000.  Transitional Federal Govern-
ment (‘TFG’) and Ethiopian armed forces fought against opposition clan-
based groups and militias, most prominently al-Shabab (‘youth’) militias 
which emerged out of the former Islamic Courts Union (‘ICU’).  More than 1.2 
million civilians were internally displaced in southern and central Somalia. 
At the end of the year an estimated 3.25 million people were dependent on 
emergency food aid, which was often disrupted due to widespread insecurity 
and impacted by insufficient contributions from donor governments.  Human-
itarian aid workers and local human rights defenders were increasingly tar-
geted in threats and killings.”). 
19 M.G. Kaladrahan Nayar, The Rights of Asylum in International Law: 
Its Status and Prospects, 17 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 17, 18 (1972). 
20  E.W. Vierdag, “Asylum” and “Refugee” in International Law, 24 
NETHERLANDS INT’L L. REV. 287, 287 (1977). 
21 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted July 
28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter 1951 Geneva Convention]. 
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Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”) Statute.  
The final act of the conference that adopted the 1951 Conven-
tion, however, recommended that “[g]overnments continue to 
receive refugees in their territories and . . . act in concert in a 
true spirit of international co-operation in order that these ref-
ugees may find asylum and the possibility of resettlement.”22  
At the time of the drafting of the 1948 Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights (“UDHR”), in which the right to seek and 
enjoy asylum was first introduced in a universal, non-binding 
instrument, it was proposed that individuals also enjoyed a 
right to be granted asylum.23  At the initiative of the British 
delegation, however, states concurred that individuals could 
only enjoy a right to seek asylum from persecution.  This so-
called right of asylum ended up consisting of “the [mere] com-
petence of every state to allow a persecuted alien to enter, re-
main on its territory . . . and thereby to grant asylum to him.”24  
In the twentieth century, no state practice supports an interna-
tional legal recognition of an individual’s right to be granted 
asylum.25 
The term “asylum” has generally been interpreted as a 
protection tied to assimilation in a new society, touching more 
deeply upon the issue of state sovereignty.26  If understood in 
                                                 
22 United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refu-
gees & Stateless Persons, Final Act of the United Nations Conference of Plen-
ipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.2/108/Rev.1 (July 25, 1951), in THE COLLECTED TRAVAUX 
PRÉPARATOIRES OF THE 1951 GENEVA CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF 
REFUGEES 692, 696 (Alex Takkenberg & Christopher C. Tahbaz, eds., 1989). 
23 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 14, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (“(1) Everyone has the right to seek 
and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution; (2) This right may 
not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political 
crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Na-
tions.”). 
24 Pirkko Kourula, Broadening the Edges: Refugee Definition and Inter-
national Protection Revisited 273 (1997) (quoting Lassa Oppenheim, Interna-
tional Law: A Treatise 678 (Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 1967)). 
25 Felice Morgenstern, The Right of Asylum, 26 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 327, 
352 (1949) (expressing, as of 1949, that “[i]t would . . . appear that the prac-
tice of states has not created a right of individuals to asylum, except, per-
haps, in the matter of non-extradition of political offenders.”); see also Frank 
E. Krenz, The Refugee as a Subject of International Law, 15 INT’L & COMP. 
L.Q. 90, 115 (1966) (“[T]he realisation of an individual right to asylum is still 
to await some kind of formal recognition.”). 
26 KOURULA, supra note 24, at 273-74. 
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this way, an ulterior motive exists for states not to recognize an 
individual’s emerging right to be granted asylum.27   
In addition, the issue of an existing right of individuals to 
be granted asylum, if they apply for it, was also discussed by 
the International Law Commission (“ILC”) at its first session in 
1949 in connection with a draft declaration on the rights and 
duties of states.  At this time, a proposal was submitted to in-
clude an additional article related to the right of asylum.  The 
draft article read:  
Every State has the right to accord asylum to persons of any na-
tionality who request it in consequence of persecutions for of-
fences which the State according asylum deems to have a politi-
cal character. The State of which the refugee is a national has 
the duty to respect the asylum accorded and may not consider it 
an unfriendly act.28  
During the debates on this proposal, the first sentence was 
amended by omission of the words: “which the state according 
asylum deems to have.”  The second sentence was rejected.  Fi-
nally, it was decided not to include an article on asylum in the 
draft declaration even though one of the members of the com-
mittee in charge of writing the document pointed out: 
The right of asylum was one of the noblest creations of custom-
ary international law. It would be inconceivable not to include it 
in a general declaration on the rights and duties of States, and 
the proposed additional article should therefore be included in 
the declaration which the Commission was preparing.29   
This latter affirmation is important because it mentions the 
customary nature of the right of asylum.30  In effect, while a 
state is not compelled to grant asylum, an individual admitted 
                                                 
27 Id. 
28 Summary Records and Documents of the First Section Including the 
Report to the Commission to the General Assembly, [1957] 1 Y.B. Int’l L. 
Comm’n 3, 125, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1949 (1956). Twenty years later, the 
latter sentence was absorbed into the 1969 AU Convention which stipulates 
that “asylum . . . shall not be regarded as an unfriendly act by any Member 
State.” 1969 AU Convention, supra note 5, art 2. 
29 Id. at 126 (noting a statement of J.M. Yepes). 
30 Paul Kuruk, Refugeeism, A Dilemma in International Human Rights: 
Problems in the Legal Protection of Refugees in West Africa, 1 TEMP. INT’L & 
COMP. L.J. 179, 192-93 (1987) [hereinafter Kuruk, Refugeeism] (“Customary 
law is viewed as a crucial factor for the protection of African refugees. It is 
believed that under this mode of protection refugees are received by their 
kinsmen who facilitate their integration into the new society.”). 
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to the territory of a state in which he seeks refuge should be 
entitled to enjoy it.31  
According to general doctrine, asylum consists of several 
elements. The granting of asylum is the equivalent of (i) admit-
ting an individual to the territory of a State; (ii) allowing 
her/him to remain in that territory; (iii) refusing to expel or ex-
tradite her/him; and (iv) avoiding prosecution, punishment, or 
other restriction on the individual’s liberty under Articles 31, 
32 and 33 of the 1951 Geneva Convention, which together ar-
ticulate the very important principle of non-refoulement. 32   
                                                 
31 In’l Law Comm’n, supra note 28. Based on this author’s analysis, Mr. 
J.M. Yepes intended the expression “right of asylum” to include a right to en-
joy asylum. 
32 1951 Geneva Convention, supra note 21, art. 33 (“1) No Contracting 
State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to 
the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on 
account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion.  2) The benefit of the present provision may not, 
however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for re-
garding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, hav-
ing been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, consti-
tutes a danger to the community of that country.”).  See generally Jean 
Allain, The Jus Cogens Nature of Non-Refoulement, 13 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 
533 (2001); Rene Bruin & Kees Wouters, Terrorism and Non-Derogability of 
Non-Refoulement, 15 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 5 (2003); Phil C.W. Chan, The Pro-
tection of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons: Non-Refoulement Under 
Customary International Law?, 10 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 231 (2006); Vincent 
Chetail, Le principe de Non-Refoulement et le statut de réfugié en droit inter-
national, in LA CONVENTION DE GENÈVE DU 28 JUILLET 1951 RELATIVE AU 
STATUT DES RÉFUGIÉS 50 ANS APRÈS: BILAN ET PERSPECTIVES 3 (Vincent Chetail 
ed., 2001); Nils Coleman, Non-Refoulement Revised: Renewed Review of the 
Status of the Principle of Non-Refoulement as Customary International Law, 
5 EUR. J. MIGRATION & L. 23 (2003); Aoife Duffy, Expulsion to Face Torture? 
Non-Refoulement in International Law, 20 Int’l J. Refugee L. 373 (2008); 
Jean-Francois Durieux & Jane McAdam, Non-Refoulement Through Time: 
The Case for a Derogation Clause to the Refugee Convention in Mass Influx 
Emergencies, 16 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 4 (2004); Florentino P. Feliciano, The 
Principle of Non-Refoulement: A Note on International Legal Protection of 
Refugees and Displaced Persons, 57 PHIL. L.J. 598 (1982); Guy S. Goodwin-
Gill, Non-Refoulement and the New Asylum Seekers, 26 VA. J. INT’L L. 897 
(1986); Patricia Hyndman, Asylum and Non-Refoulement—Are These Obliga-
tions Owed to Refugees Under International Law?, 57 PHIL. L.J. 43 (1982); Sir 
Elihu Lauterpacht & Daniel Bethlehem, The Scope and Content of the Princi-
ple of Non-Refoulement: Opinion, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: UNHCR’S GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 87 
(Erika Feller et al. eds., 2003); Reinhard Marx, Non-Refoulement, Access to 
Procedures, and Responsibilities for Determining Refugee Claims, 7 INT’L J. 
REFUGEE L. 383 (1995); Robert L. Newmark, Non-Refoulement Run Afoul: 
The Questionable Legality of Extraterritorial Repatriation Programs, 71 
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The Convention covers several aspects of the concept of 
asylum.33  While none of its articles alone give refugees the 
right to enter another country, read together, they provide for 
some real protection; “[f]or, although an administrative act of 
ordering the expulsion of a refugee may not offend against arti-
cle 32, an actual expulsion may be forbidden under article 33 if 
it will result in the return of the refugee to a country where he 
or she fears persecution.”34  Consequently, the right to enjoy 
asylum cannot be considered an “empty phrase,”35 but must be 
considered an expression of custom based on the history of re-
lations among states that found an implicit codification in SSA 
in 1951 through the universal Convention.36  
In 1967, the United Nations General Assembly (“UNGA”) 
elaborated on the Declaration on Territorial Asylum,37 keeping 
Article 14 of the UDHR in mind.  Article 14, in its final form, 
recognized the right to seek and enjoy asylum, but not the right 
to be granted asylum.38  Article 14 was based on the concept of 
                                                                                                             
WASH. U. L. Q. 833 (1993); Jari Pirjola, Shadows in Paradise: Exploring Non-
Refoulement as an Open Concept, 20 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 639 (2008); Robert 
C. Sexton, Political Refugees, Non-Refoulement and State Practice: A Com-
parative Study, 18 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 731 (1985); David Weissbrodt & 
Isabel Hortreiter, The Principle of Non-Refoulement: Article 3 of the Conven-
tion Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment in Comparison with the Non-Refoulement Provisions of Other 
International Human Rights Treaties, 5 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (1999).      
33 Alice Edwards, Human Rights, Refugees, and the Right ‘To Enjoy’ Asy-
lum, 17 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 293, 302-03 (2005). 
34 Patricia Hyndman, Refugees Under International Law with a Reference 
to the Concept of Asylum, 60 AUSTL. L.J. 148, 153 (1986) [hereinafter Hynd-
man, Refugees Under International Law]. 
35Richard Plender & Nuala Mole, Beyond the Geneva Convention: Con-
structing a de facto Right of Asylum From International Human Rights In-
struments, in REFUGEE RIGHTS AND REALITIES: EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL 
CONCEPTS AND REGIMES 81, 82 (Frances Nicholson & Patrick Twomey eds., 
1999). 
36 Paul Kuruk, however, noted that the lack of an enforcement mecha-
nism in the 1951 Convention to provide guarantees of asylum “. . . is a serious 
omission.  As a human rights instrument, the 1951 Convention should not 
only define the content of human rights concepts but also should clarify the 
government conduct mandated by those rights, thereby stimulating internal 
and external pressures for reform.”  Paul Kuruk, Asylum and the Non-
Refoulement of Refugees: The Case of the Missing Shipload of Liberian Refu-
gees, 35 STAN. J. INT’L L. 313, 330 (1999) [hereinafter Kuruk, Asylum and the 
Non-Refoulement of Refugees]. 
37 Declaration on Territorial Asylum, G.A. Res. 2312 (XXII), U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/2312(XXII) (Dec. 14, 1967). 
38 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 23, art. 14. 
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asylum as a right of the state to grant asylum, rather than as 
right of the individual to be granted asylum.  In this respect, P. 
Kuruk states: 
The international reluctance to recognize the enforceable right 
of asylum is based on the fear that such recognition would run 
counter to the principle of territorial sovereignty. Less signifi-
cantly, individuals would be viewed merely as objects, not sub-
jects, of international law. Besides, governments are afraid to 
underwrite a right of asylum, especially when they are unable to 
predict the volume, demography, and frequency of asylum-
seekers. The potentially disruptive effects of large scale refugee 
flows remain a major concern. Compounding these issues are 
the difficulties asylum countries face in providing satisfactory 
solutions to refugee crises.39 
This position has been stressed many times in SSA, where 
states prefer to sanction efforts to contain refugee flows from 
their countries of origin over the granting of asylum.  This 
preference was exemplified by the decision of states in the 
Great Lakes region after the refugee crisis following the Rwan-
dese genocide called for safe zones in Burundi and Rwanda 
within which civilian populations could be protected and to 
which refugees already outside those countries could be repat-
riated.  In fact, however, the legality of these safe areas was 
questioned.40  The concept of safe areas implies that repatriates 
have no choice of residence or movement from the safe areas to 
other parts of the country, a violation of their freedom of 
movement41 affirmed in Article 26 of the 1951 Geneva Conven-
                                                 
39 Kuruk, Asylum and the Non-Refoulement of Refugees, supra note 36, at 
321. 
40 Bonaventure Rutinwa, Beyond Durable Solutions: An Appraisal of the 
New Proposals for Prevention and Solution of Refugee Crisis in the Great 
Lakes Region, 9 J. REFUGEE STUD. 312, 313-15 (1996). 
41 Id. (musing on the difficulty of movement for refugees in Africa); see 
also Zachery Lomo, The Struggle for Protection of the Rights of Refugees and 
IDPs in Africa: Making the Existing International Legal Regime Work, 18 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 268, 281 (2000) (“In practice, however, considerable ob-
stacles to travel, even in emergencies, exist for African refugees.  For exam-
ple, our research in both Kenya and Uganda has demonstrated that refugees 
must navigate a hierarchy of power before they can finally get a ‘movement 
permit’ that authorizes them to leave the settlement or camp.  In Uganda, in 
order to ‘legally’ leave the settlement, a refugee must first get a letter from 
the chairman of the Refugee Welfare Committee, allowing her to visit the 
Ugandan camp commandant, where she must get another letter that permits 
her to travel to a specific destination for a limited period of time.  The offices 
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tion.42   
In SSA, the stereotype of African hospitality has contribut-
ed to the misconception, recognized by contemporary scholars,43 
that in past decades refugees were generally welcomed by their 
brethren across borders44 and provided with the necessary 
means to earn a living.45  Official sources have been more dip-
lomatic concerning this issue, only partially admitting the real 
situation.46       
                                                                                                             
of the camp commandants are not always nearby, nor are these officials al-
ways available when a refugee has reached their offices.  Moreover, such 
permission is not always forthcoming because both gatekeepers have wide 
powers of discretion.”). 
42 1951 Geneva Convention, supra note 21, art. 26 (“Each Contracting 
State shall accord to refugees lawfully in its territory the right to choose their 
place of residence to move freely within its territory, subject to any regula-
tions applicable to aliens generally in the same circumstances.”). 
43 See GAIM KIBREAB, AFRICAN REFUGEES: REFLECTIONS ON THE AFRICAN 
REFUGEE PROBLEM 68-69, 80 (1985) (providing examples of disturbing trends 
developed in Africa in the 1980s); Kuruk, Asylum and the Non-Refoulement of 
Refugees, supra note 36, at 336 (sharing a similar analysis: “the capacity of 
traditional hospitality to protect the continuing waves of African refugees is 
doubtful, as illustrated by the treatment of the Liberian refugees.”). 
44 See Kuruk, Refugeeism, supra note 30, at 197 (noting the example of 
the “[E]wes from Ghana and Fangs from Equatorial Guinea that were able to 
integrate easily among their brethren in Senegal, Togo and Cameroon, re-
spectively.”). 
45 See Bonaventure Rutinwa, The End of Asylum? The Changing Nature 
of Refugee Policies in Africa 4 (Oxford Univ. Refugees Study Program, Work-
ing Paper No. 5, 1999) (describing the attitude adopted by many African 
states between the early 1960s and 1990 as an “open door policy” towards 
asylum-seekers). More precisely, Rutinwa argues: “The evolution of refugee 
policy in Africa may be divided into two periods. The first is the period be-
tween early 1960s and the mid- to late 1980s. The second is the period be-
tween the late 1980s to today. The period between the early 1960s and 1990 
may be described as the ‘golden age’ of asylum in Africa. The attitude adopted 
by many states during this period has been described as an ‘open door poli-
cy.’”  Id. at 4. 
46 See ORG. OF AFRICAN UNITY, ADDIS ABABA DOCUMENT ON REFUGEES AND 
FORCED POPULATION DISPLACEMENTS IN AFRICA ¶ 12 (1994) (“[T]hroughout the 
continent, countries are generous towards refugees and many practice liberal 
asylum policies.”).  But the following paragraph notes: “[n]evertheless, the 
institution of asylum and the system of refugee protection are under tremen-
dous stress in Africa.  The large number of refugees seeking asylum in coun-
tries already themselves experiencing tremendous social and economic hard-
ships, has brought into question the very capacity of nations to come with 
refugees.  In a number of countries, the basic principles of refugee protection 
are not being upheld. Refugees have been arrested and detained without 
charge.  Others have been resumed against their will to places where their 
lives may be in danger.  Yet others have been restricted to refugee camps or 
to remote, inaccessible locations where they are sometimes exposed to ban-
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One could argue that traditional African hospitality in ad-
mitting aliens is evidence that, within SSA at least, asylum-
seekers could have been guaranteed the right to be granted 
asylum.47  Article 2 of the 1969 AU Convention, however, which 
crystallized the concept of asylum by codifying historical prac-
tice in a legal instrument,48 points out that the granting of asy-
lum in SSA should be considered more of a “humanitarian 
act”49 and less of an act undertaken by local authorities to com-
ply with a legally recognized right.   
                                                                                                             
ditry, rape and other forms of criminality.  Many have not been able to enjoy 
social, economic and civil rights.” Id. ¶ 13.   
47 Kuruk, Refugeeism, supra note 30, at 198 (“In ascertaining customary 
law, it would be wrong to refer to past practices as evidence of the existing 
customary law; the only appropriate approach is to look at present practices.  
It is contended that although the so-called traditional African hospitality 
used to be strong in the past, socio-economic factors have rendered it practi-
cally non-existent in modern-day Africa.  There is no longer a spirit of hospi-
tality which continues to be influential in the protection of refugees at cus-
tomary law.”) (emphasis added). 
48 See 1969 African Convention, supra note 5, art. 2 (“1) Member States 
of the OAU shall use their best endeavours consistent with their respective 
legislations to receive refugees and to secure the settlement of those refugees 
who, for well-founded reasons, are unable or unwilling to return to their 
country of origin or nationality.  2) The grant of asylum to refugees is a peace-
ful and humanitarian act and shall not be regarded as an unfriendly act by 
any Member State.  3) No person shall be subjected by a Member State to 
measures such as rejection at the frontier, return or expulsion, which would 
compel him to return to or remain in a territory where his life, physical integ-
rity or liberty would be threatened for the reasons set out in Article I, para-
graphs 1 and 2.  4) Where a Member State finds difficulty in continuing to 
grant asylum to refugees, such Member State may appeal directly to other 
Member States and through the OAU, and such other Member States shall in 
the spirit of African solidarity and international cooperation take appropriate 
measures to lighten the burden of the Member State granting asylum.  5) 
Where a refugee has not received the right to reside in any country of asylum, 
he may be granted temporary residence in any country of asylum in which he 
first presented himself as a refugee pending arrangement for his resettle-
ment in accordance with the preceding paragraph.  6) For reasons of security, 
countries of asylum shall, as far as possible, settle refugees at a reasonable 
distance from the frontier of their country of origin.”). 
49 Nlerum S. Okogbule, The Legal Dimensions of the Refugee Problem in 
Africa, 10 E. AFR. J. PEACE & HUM. RTS. 183 (2004) (affirming that by the pro-
vision of Article 2(1), the country concerned would be required to exercise this 
“peaceful and humanitarian act”—the concession of the asylum—exclusively 
in consideration of the African tradition); see also W.J.E.M. Van Hövell tot 
Westerflier, Africa and Refugees: The OAU Refugee Convention in Theory and 
Practice, 7 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 172, 176 (1989) (“Article II, paragraph 2 states 
that the grant of asylum is a peaceful and humanitarian act.  This approach 
is further reflected in Article V, which describes five important principles re-
garding voluntary repatriation.”).  
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In addition, it has been clearly affirmed that the wording 
of Article 2(1) of the 1969 African Convention is advisory rather 
than compulsory.50  In other words, the reception of refugees is 
subject to national legislation, which constitutes a severe limi-
tation on the effective enjoyment of the right of asylum.51   
Possibly, it has been determined that the right to be grant-
ed asylum is a moral and not a legal right.52  As previously not-
ed, however, the asylum principle adopted in the 1969 African 
Convention corresponds to the principle embodied in the 1967 
UNGA Declaration on Territorial Asylum, without significant 
changes.53      
African regional organizations have confirmed many times 
that the principle of granting asylum is not mandatory.  When 
these organizations speak about asylum, they define it as an 
institution more than a right.54  One commentator correctly 
and pragmatically argues that an “open-door” policy adopted by 
states in a general state of poverty cannot alleviate the plight 
of refugees, adding that: 
The influx of a large number of refugees in the world’s poorest 
nations brings with it a variety of difficulties and places great 
strains on the country’s inadequate national resources and this 
naturally erodes the hospitality demonstrated at the time of ar-
rival.  Consequently, unless there is an active intervention on 
the part of the international refugee assisting organizations, the 
plight of the refugees will continue unabated.55  
Nevertheless, Article 2 of the AU Convention constitutes 
one of the most important innovations introduced by a regional 
                                                 
50 Paul Weis, The Convention of the Organisation of African Unity Gov-
erning the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, 3 HUM. RTS.  J. 457, 
457 (1970). 
51 Id.; see also Rainer Hofmann, Refugee Law in Africa, 39 L. & ST. 84, 84 
(1989).  
52 Kuruk, Refugeeism, supra note 30, at 218.    
53 Bahame Tom Mukira-Nyanduga, Refugee Protection Under the 1969 
OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Afri-
ca, 94 GER. Y.B. INT’L L. 94, 94 (2004).  
54 See Org. of African Unity, supra note 46, at ¶ 14(iii).  In 1979, the 
Arusha Conference on the African refugee noted that, although some pro-
gress had been made in the direction of strengthening the position of the in-
dividual in relation of asylum, “asylum is still a right of the State.” Int’l Con-
ference on the Situation of Refugees in Afr., Recommendations from the Pan-
African Conference on the Situation of Refugees in Africa, Arusha (Tanzania), 
17 May, 1979, ¶ 1(1).    
55 KIBREAB, supra note 43, at 69.   
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instrument with respect to refugee status.  Through providing 
for the “right to grant asylum,” it appears that the AU Conven-
tion has advanced the notion of an individual right to be grant-
ed asylum beyond that which the 1951 Geneva Convention 
provides.56  In the international legal history of Africa, howev-
er, there have not been any initiatives to provide for a right to 
be granted asylum since the failed United Nations Conference 
on Territorial Asylum held in Geneva in 1977.  This Conference 
was considered to be unsuccessful by eminent scholar, A. 
Grahl-Madsen.57  Nonetheless, this is the same eminent scholar 
who, in 1980, eleven years after the adoption of the 1969 AU 
Convention wrote: “[a] right of asylum . . . may flow from inter-
national conventions, but so far there are only rudimental pro-
visions to this effect.”58  In so much as the term “international” 
has been conventionally interpreted to incorporate the meaning 
of the term “regional,” A. Grahl-Madsen may have intended 
“international” to mean “intercontinental.” 
For instance, the term “asylum” has been used to charac-
terize South African student refugees in bordering countries 
who were assisted by UNHCR during approximately the same 
period in which A. Grahl-Madsen wrote his comment.59  The 
use of the word “asylum,” might be an attempt to emphasize 
that these individuals were in reality refugees rather than stu-
dents.  When contrasted with other situations in SSA, the use 
of the term “asylum” may reflect a greater sensitivity to the po-
litical nature of their plight.60               
In general, however, UN resolutions relating to Africa deal 
                                                 
56 Ahmed Rifaat, Refugees and the Right of Asylum: An African Perspec-
tive, 40 REVUE EGYPTIENNE DE DROIT INT’L 71, 104-06 (1984). 
57 ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, TERRITORIAL ASYLUM 66 (1980) (“[I]t is important 
to stress that refugee law in general, and the right of asylum in particular, 
are problems of global scope, which ought to be solved at the global level.”). 
58 Id. at 2. 
59 G.A. Res. 32/119, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/32/119 (Dec. 16, 1977) 
(“[UNGA] notes with appreciation the generous contributions of Governments 
of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland in providing asylum and making availa-
ble educational facilities for student refugees.”) (emphasis added).  On the 
contrary, in both earlier and later situations, such as the ones involving So-
malia, Sudan, and Djibouti, the term “asylum” was omitted.  See G.A. Res. 
2958 (XXVII), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2958 (Dec. 12, 1972); G.A. Res. 35/180, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/35/180 (Dec. 15, 1972); G.A. Res. 35/181, U.N. Doc. A/RES/35/181 
(Dec. 15, 1980); G.A. Res. 35/182, U.N. Doc. A/RES/35/182 (Dec. 15, 1980). 
60 David Kennedy, International Refugee Protection, 8 HUM. RTS. Q. 32, 
32 (1986).  
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only marginally with asylum in the framework of protection of 
refugees, usually because they are more assistance-oriented61 
than theoretical.  UN resolutions often simply restrict them-
selves to confirming the humanitarian characterization of asy-
lum, as the Executive Committee of UNHCR (“ExCom”) fre-
quently does,62 admitting the presence of asylum as an 
                                                 
61 See G.A. Res. 45/181, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/181 (Dec. 4, 1986); G.A. 
Res. 41/123, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/123 (Dec. 4, 1986); G.A. Res. 42/106, ¶ 4-6, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/42/106 (Dec. 7, 1987); G.A. Res. 42/107, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/42/106 (Dec. 7, 1987). 
62 See United Nations High Comm’r for Refugees, Exec. Comm., General 
Conclusion on International Protection, ¶ c, U.N. Doc. A/43/12/Add.1 (Oct. 10, 
1988) (“States must continue to be guided, in their treatment of refugees, by 
existing international law and humanitarian principles and practice.”); Unit-
ed Nations High Comm’r for Refugees, Exec. Comm., Safeguarding Asylum, ¶ 
e, U.N. Doc. 12A (A/52/12/Add.1) (Oct. 10, 1997) (“[The ExCom] calls upon all 
concerned parties to respect and comply with the precepts on which the insti-
tution of asylum is based, and to implement their obligations in a spirit of 
true humanitarianism.”).  For an exhaustive document on the legal responsi-
bilities of the ExCom, see Jerzi Sztucki, The Conclusions on the International 
Protection of Refugees Adopted by the Executive Committee of the UNHCR 
Programme, 1 INT’L J. OF REFUGEES L. 285, 288 (1989) (“The Executive Com-
mittee of the UNHCR Programme . . . was formally established by ECOSOC 
Res. 672(XXV) April 30, 1958, pursuant to the request by the General As-
sembly to replace (as of January 1, 1959) the so-called UNREF (United Na-
tions Refugee Emergency Fund) Executive Committee.  The terms of refer-
ence of the new Committee, as formulated in paragraph 5 of General 
Assembly resolution 1166(XII) (26 November 1957), were as follows: (a) To 
give directives to the High Commissioner for the liquidation of the United 
Nations Refugee Fund; (b) To advise the High Commissioner, at his request, 
in the exercise of his function under the Statute of his Office; (c) To advise the 
High Commissioner as to whether it is appropriate for international assis-
tance to be provided through his Office in order to help to solve specific refu-
gee problems remaining unsolved after 31 December 1958 or arising after 
that date; (d) To authorize the High Commissioner to make appeals for funds 
to enable him to solve the refugee problems referred to in sub-paragraph c) 
above; (e) To approve projects for assistance to refugees coming within the 
scope of sub-paragraph (c) above; (f) To give directives to the High Commis-
sioner for the use of the emergency.”).  To summarize, although established 
by ECOSOC, ExCom functions as a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly 
and its documentation is issued in a General Assembly series.  ExCom’s re-
port is submitted directly to the General Assembly for consideration in the 
Third Committee. UNHCR´s Statute Article 3 directs that the High Commis-
sioner “shall follow policy directives given him by the General Assembly or 
the Economic and Social Council.” Statute of the Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees, G.A. Res. 428 (v), U.N. Doc. A/1775 (Dec. 
14, 1950).  ExCom does not substitute for the policy making functions of the 
General Assembly or ECOSOC, but it does have its own executive and advi-
sory functions.  These include: to advise the High Commissioner in the exer-
cise of his/her functions; to review funds and programmes; to authorize the 
High Commissioner to make appeals for funds; to approve proposed biennial 
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institution and adopting the formula regionally codified in Ar-
ticle 2(2) of the 1969 AU Convention without going much fur-
ther.63    
Alternatively, recalling Article 14 of the UDHR, the UNGA 
sometimes provides general guidelines to be followed by states: 
[The General Assembly] reaffirms that, as set out in article 14 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, everyone has the 
right to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from persecu-
tion, and calls upon all States to refrain from taking measures 
that jeopardize the institution of asylum, in particular by re-
turning or expelling refugees or asylum-seekers contrary to in-
ternational standards.64 
In contrast, ExCom has tried to be more generous in dealing 
with asylum by providing a framework for protecting and as-
sisting persons in need of international protection, while ensur-
ing that proper long-term solutions can be achieved.65  ExCom 
urges governments to follow “liberal . . . practices” in granting 
asylum to refugees who enter their territory and calls upon 
governments to cooperate with the Office of the High Commis-
sioner in the performance of its task—particularly with respect 
to asylum.66  In 1997, ExCom reaffirmed “[t]hat the institution 
of asylum, which derives directly from the right to seek and en-
joy asylum set out in Article 14(1) of the 1948 Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights, is among the most basic mechanisms 
for the international protection of refugees.”67 
                                                                                                             
budget targets.” ExComm Mandate and Statute, UNHCR, 
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c36 46c86.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2011).  
63 See G.A. Res. 62/125, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/125 (Dec. 18, 2007); 
G.A. Res. 61/139, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/139 (Dec. 19, 2006); G.A. Res. 
60/128, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/128 (Dec. 13, 2005). 
64 G.A. Res. 54/146, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/146 (Dec. 17, 1999).  
65 United Nations High Comm’r for Refugees, Exec. Comm., General 
Conclusion on International Protection, ¶ n, U.N. Doc A/53/12/Add.1 (Oct. 9, 
1998) [hereinafter General Conclusion on International Protection]. 
66 United Nations High Comm’r for Refugees, Exec. Comm., Note on Asy-
lum, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. EC/SCP/4 (Aug. 24, 1977).  
67 See United Nations High Comm’r for Refugees, Exec. Comm., Safe-
guarding Asylum, ¶ b, U.N. Doc. A/52/12/Add.1 (Oct. 17, 1997) [hereinafter 
Safeguarding Asylum]. Compare General Conclusion on International Protec-
tion, supra note 66, ¶ f (“[The ExCom] notes that the 50th anniversary of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights is being commemorated this year 
and reaffirms that the institution of asylum, which derives directly from the 
right to seek and enjoy asylum from persecution set out in Article 14 of the 
Declaration, is among the most basic mechanisms for the protection of refu-
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Aware that there is no universally recognized, legally bind-
ing instrument promoting the enforcement of asylum, however, 
in 1977, ExCom stopped requesting the High Commissioner “to 
draw the attention”68 of governments to the different interna-
tional instruments existing in this field.  At the regional level, 
the 2001 final text of the Asian-African Legal Consultative Or-
ganization’s (“AALCO”) 1966 Bangkok Principles on Status and 
Treatment of Refugees indirectly strengthened this concept, af-
firming that “a State has the sovereign right to grant or to re-
fuse asylum in its territory to a refugee.”69  Under this frame-
work, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(Banjul Charter) provides that an individual has the right “to 
seek and obtain asylum” elsewhere if persecuted, although it 
does not provide an obligation of states to receive refugees.70  
Additionally, the obtaining of asylum is qualified by the not 
well established clause “when persecuted.”71 Nevertheless, con-
cession of asylum can be analyzed under the purview of the 
1951 Geneva Convention and the 1969 African Convention.   
Under this framework, however, questions concerning 
“western-oriented” forms of persecution, not always considered 
such in SSA, still remain unresolved.72  A typical example of 
                                                                                                             
gees.”), with United Nations High Comm’r for Refugees, Exec. Comm., Gen-
eral Conclusion on International Protection, ¶ c, U.N. Doc. A/46/12/Add.1 
(Oct. 11, 1991) (“[The ExCom] emphasizes the primary importance of non-
refoulement and asylum as cardinal principles of refugee protection . . .”), and 
United Nations High Comm’r for Refugees, Exec. Comm., General Conclusion 
on International Protection, ¶ f, U.N. Doc. A/47/12/Add.1 (Oct. 9, 1992) (“[The 
ExCom] reaffirms the primary importance of the principles of non-
refoulement and asylum as basic to refugee protection[.]”).  But see Safeguard-
ing Asylum, ¶ c (noticing the “[g]rowing complexity of refugee crises poses se-
rious and novel challenges to the institution of asylum.”).  
68 See Safeguarding Asylum, supra note 67, ¶ b. 
69 Asian-African Legal Consultative Org., Bangkok Principles on the Sta-
tus and Treatment of Refugees, art. 2(2), (Dec. 31, 1966).  It is worth noting 
that this statement has been accepted without any reservations by African 
governments.  
70 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, art. 12.3, Jun. 27, 
1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 26363 (“Every individual shall have the right, when per-
secuted, to seek and obtain asylum in other countries in accordance with laws 
of those countries and international conventions.”). 
71 Id.  
72 Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi, Rights of Refugees and Internally Displaced 
Persons in Africa, in THE AFRICAN REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM: 30 YEARS 
AFTER THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS 177, 185 (Mani-
suli Ssenyonjo ed. 2012).    
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this involves the persecution of homosexuals, still practiced in 
several countries in SSA.  For example, in Uganda, where re-
cently a bill was introduced in its Parliament outlawing the 
promotion of homosexuality,73 an asylum-seeker would likely 
not be able to apply for asylum there if such a bill were to be-
come law and asylum was sought to avoid persecution for being 
a homosexual.  Given the language of this legislation, homo-
sexuals are unlikely to be considered part of a specific “social 
group” protected in principle by section 4a of the 2006 Ugandan 
Refugees Act.  And, as article 12.3 of the Banjul Charter ex-
plains, an individual can have asylum granted only “[i]n ac-
cordance with laws of those [African] countries.” 
In addition, ExCom, which obviously welcomed the devel-
opment of legislation on asylum as well as the establishment of 
processes for status determination and admission of refugees in 
a number of African countries,74 has, in accordance with sever-
al principles, provided common criteria to identify the country 
responsible for examining an asylum request.  In developing 
the “general policies under which the High Commissioner shall 
plan, develop and administer the programmes,”75 however, Ex-
Com has created very broad guidelines for the identification of 
such a country without going beyond its mandate.   
Among others terms, ExCom has stressed that it is fair for 
a state to try to call upon another state to grant asylum to an 
                                                 
73 A Bill for an Act Entitled the Anti Homosexuality Act, 2009, Bill Supp. 
No. 13, CII Uganda Gazette No. 47 (Sept. 25, 2009) (“The objectives of the 
Bill are to: a) provide for marriage in Uganda as that contracted only between 
a man and a woman; b) prohibit and penalize homosexual behavior and relat-
ed practices in Uganda as they constitute a threat to the traditional family; c) 
prohibit ratification of any international treaties, conventions, protocols, 
agreements and declarations which are contrary or inconsistent with the pro-
visions of this Act; d) prohibit the licensing of organizations which promote 
homosexuality.”).  See also Press Release, Amnesty International, Uganda: 
Anti-homosexuality bill ‘a grave assault on human rights,’ (Feb. 7, 2012), 
available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/uganda-anti 
-homosexuality-bill-grave-assault-human-rights-2012-02-07.  As of May 2012, 
Liberia is also in the process of adopting an anti-homosexual bill. See E. J. 
Nathaniel Daygbor, Liberia: House Decides Anti-Gay Bill 28 Feb., ALLAFRICA 
(Feb. 27, 2012), http://allafrica.com/stories/201202271012.html. 
74 See United Nations High Comm’r for Refugees, Exec. Comm., General 
Conclusion on International Protection, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/1003 (Oct. 8, 
2004). 
75 United Nations Econ. & Social Council, Exec. Comm., Establishment of 
the Executive Committee of the Programme of the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees, ¶ 2(a), U.N. Doc. E/RES/672 (Apr. 30, 1958).  
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individual if the second state has a closer connection to the in-
dividual than the original state in which the individual asked 
for asylum.76  Furthermore, ExCom has highlighted several 
other important principles such as: “[w]hile asylum-seekers 
may be required to submit their asylum request within a cer-
tain time limit, failure to do so, or the non-fulfilment of other 
formal requirements, should not lead to an asylum request be-
ing excluded from consideration.”77 
The verb “should” used in the above sentence is condition-
al.  However, African domestic legislation on refugees generally 
contains no norms that penalize an asylum-seeker if she or he 
does not comply with the formal requirements requested by the 
law.78  In the judgement of Malawi v. Rahman, the Lilongwe 
Magistrate Court recognized the special situation of the “failed-
state” of Somalia79 and consequently justified the illegal entry 
                                                 
76 United Nations High Comm’r for Refugees, Exec. Comm., Refugees 
Without an Asylum Country, ¶ h(iv), U.N. Doc. A/34/12/Add.1 (Oct. 16, 1979). 
77 Id. at ¶ i(i). 
78 See DIÁRIO DA REPÚBLICA [C. CIV] art. 5(3) (Act No. 8/1990) (Angl.) (“A 
refugee who is unlawfully present in the country shall not be punished for the 
act of unlawful entry or presence provided that he presents himself to the au-
thorities and justifies his situation.”); The Refugees Act, art. 9, ¶ 1 (Act No. 
9/1998) (Tanz.) (“Any person entering or who is within Tanzania, whether 
lawfully or otherwise and who wishes to remain in Tanzania as a refugee 
within the meaning of section 4 shall immediately and not later than seven 
days after entry, unless he can show reasonable cause for delay, present him-
self or report to the nearest authorized officer, village Executive Officer, or a 
justice of peace and apply for recognition as a refugee.”).  Note that nothing is 
said in the case of the asylum-seeker who presents himself after seven days 
and without showing a reasonable cause for her/his delay.  But see JOURNAL 
OFFICIEL [C. CIV] art. 29, ¶ 2 (Act No. 021/2002) (Dem. Rep. Congo) (“[P]eut 
être interpellé par les services compétents qui le déféreront devant la Com-
mission Nationale pour les Réfugiés.”).  Note that the formula used here is 
not strict with reference to an asylum-seeker. 
79 See Tara Magner, Does a Failed State Country of Origin Result in a 
Failure of International Protection? A Review of Policies Toward Asylum-
Seekers in Leading Asylum Nations, 15 GEO. IMMGR. L.J. 703, 704 (2001) (“A 
failed state is distinguishable from a nation destabilized by civil strife or 
guerrilla warfare.  Failed states are a phenomenon that is ‘deeper . . . than 
mere rebellion, coup, or riot.  [State collapse] refers to a situation where the 
structure, authority (legitimate power), law, and political order have fallen 
apart and must be reconstituted in some form, old or new.’  The World Bank 
identifies three pathologies of state collapse: 1) ‘States that have lost (or 
failed to establish) legitimacy in the eyes of most of the population . . . and 
are therefore unable to exercise . . . authority[;]’ 2) ‘[s]tates that have been 
run into the ground by leaders and officials who are corrupt, negligent, in-
competent, or all three[;]’ 3) ‘[s]tates that have fragmented into civil war, and 
in which no party is capable of re-establishing central authority.’  In sum, the 
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and residence of several Somali asylum-seekers.  The court con-
firmed: 
Illegal entry of any person for the purpose of seeking asylum 
does not disqualify the applicant from becoming a refugee.  
However, any person who illegally enters Malawi as an asylum-
seeker is supposed to present himself within 20 hours of his en-
try before a competent officer but should not be detained, im-
prisoned, declared prohibited immigrant or otherwise penalised 
by reason only of his illegal entry or presence in Malawi until 
the committee makes a decision on his application.80    
Following a similar procedure, a South African High Court, in 
Tafira v. Ngozwane, highlighted that the rights contained in 
the 1998 National Refugee Act needed to be applied to an asy-
lum-seeker, irrespective of whether she or he entered South Af-
rica legally or strictly conformed to the formal requirements for 
submitting her or his application for refugee status.81 
Regardless of these official statements, several African 
governments are occasionally reluctant to reinforce the protec-
tion of crucial rights, such as the right to seek and enjoy asy-
lum.  As a result, the goal of refugee law is significantly ham-
pered.  Several studies show the quantity of gross violations of 
human rights, for example, perpetrated on a daily basis in the 
refugee camps and other settlements where asylum-seekers 
wait for a response to their asylum requests.82   
In various circumstances, ExCom has expressed its regret 
for the restrictive asylum practices in Africa.  These expres-
sions of regret began in the early 1980s, when countries patent-
ly closed their borders to asylum-seekers.83  The attitude of 
                                                                                                             
state has experienced a ‘fundamental loss of institutional capability.’  State 
failure does not necessarily signify the absence of a government’s intention to 
offer protection to its population; it more accurately signifies the point at 
which the government is unable to accomplish any goal, no matter what the 
good intentions of its nominal leaders may be.”). 
80 Republic v. Rahman (2005) Criminal Case G 26 (Malawi). 
81 Tafira v. Ngozwane 2006 (1) SA 136 (HC) (S. Afr.); Refugee Act 130 of 
1998 § 21(4)(a) (S. Afr.) (“Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, no pro-
ceedings may be instituted or continued against any person in respect of his 
or her unlawful entry into or presence within the Republic.”). 
82 Odd E. Olsen & Kristin S. Scharffscher, Rape in Refugee Camps as Or-
ganizational Failures, 8 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 377, 377-97 (2004). 
83 See United Nations High Comm’r for Refugees, Exec. Comm. General 
Conclusion on International Protection, ¶ d, U.N. Doc. A/33/12/Add.1 (Oct. 17, 
1978) (“[The ExCom] [r]ecalled the Conclusions adopted at the twenty-eighth 
session regarding asylum and expressed concern that refugees still encoun-
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several African states was contrary to ExCom statements sup-
porting the right of an alien to seek and enjoy asylum, which 
has been confirmed several times throughout the 1990s and 
2000s.84   
Kenyan authorities denied asylum to twenty-three Somalis 
in November 2007.85  Additionally, Kenyan authorities denied 
asylum to Somalis earlier in 2007,86 and later in 2009.87  Such 
an attitude was quite paradoxical considering that, since its 
independence in 1963, Kenya has been one of the few African 
states committed to finding a regional solution for the hun-
dreds of thousands of refugees dispersed over the African con-
tinent.88  Somali asylum-seekers were clearly considered a 
                                                                                                             
tered difficulties in obtaining permanent or even temporary asylum in certain 
areas . . .”); United Nations High Comm’r for Refugees, Exec. Comm. General 
Conclusion on International Protection, ¶ d, U.N. Doc. A/37/12/Add.1 (Oct. 20, 
1982); United Nations High Comm’r for Refugees, Exec. Comm., General 
Conclusion on International Protection, ¶ e, U.N. Doc. A/38/12/Add.1 (Oct. 20, 
1983); United Nations High Comm’r for Refugees, Exec. Comm. General Con-
clusion on International Protection, ¶ d, U.N. Doc. A/39/12/Add.1 (Oct. 18, 
1984). 
84 See United Nations High Comm’r for Refugees, Exec. Comm., Note on 
International Solidarity and Refugee Protection, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. EC/SCP/50 
(Oct. 10, 1988) (“[ExCom] [i]nvited all States to continue actively to support 
the protection functions of the High Commissioner through all appropriate 
means, both bilateral and multilateral, as well as to abide by their own hu-
manitarian responsibilities towards refugees, including, particularly, to safe-
guard the right to seek and enjoy asylum from persecution....”); United Na-
tions High Comm’r for Refugees, Exec. Comm., Internally Displaced  Persons, 
¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/49/12/Add.1 (Oct. 7, 1994); General Conclusion on Interna-
tional Protection, supra note 62, ¶ f; United Nations High Comm’r for Refu-
gees, Exec. Comm., Conclusion on the Civilian and Humanitarian Character 
of Asylum, ¶ c(i), U.N. Doc. A/57/12/Add.1 (Oct. 8, 2002); United Nations High 
Comm’r for Refugees, Exec. Comm., Conclusion on Protection Safeguards in 
Interception Measures, ¶ a(iii), U.N. Doc. A/58/12/Add.1 (Oct. 10, 2003). 
85 Kenya: Unlawful deportation of Somali asylum seekers, RELIEFWEB 
(Nov. 30, 2007), http://reliefweb.int/node/252118 (“According to the Consorti-
um, the deported Somalis were denied the right to seek asylum and access to 
humanitarian organisations or the UN refugee agency (UNHCR).  They have 
been returned to Mogadishu where their safety is uncertain.”). 
86 Amnesty Int’l, Kenya: Denied Refugee: The effect of the closure of the 
Kenya/Somalia border on thousands of Somali asylum-seekers and refugees 3 
(2007). 
87 Kenya: Refoulement of Somali asylum seekers UNHCR, (Apr. 3, 2009), 
http://www.unhcr.org/49d5d9c16.html (“UNHCR wishes to express its con-
cern about the increasing trend by the Kenyan authorities to forcibly return 
Somali asylum seekers to their country.”) 
88 Edwin Odhiambo-Abuya, Past Reflections, Future Insights: African 
Asylum Law and Policy in Historical Perspective, 19 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 51, 
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“danger to the security of Kenya,” and thus excluded from refu-
gee status pursuant to the 2011 Kenyan Refugee Act.89  The 
question of what constitutes a “danger to the security” of the 
country leads to the never-ending debate of whether the host 
country is acting arbitrarily in granting asylum to applicants.   
In Kenya, which follows previous examples of national SSA leg-
islation based on concerns over “national security,”90 a refugee 
and his/her family can be expelled from the country, although 
asylum has already formally been accorded.91   
 In the last few years, Ugandan authorities have also 
shared the attitude of their Kenyan counterparts.92  Rwandan 
                                                                                                             
54 (2007). 
89 The Refugee Act, (2011) § 15 (Kenya) (“1) No person shall be refused 
entry into Kenya, expelled, extradited from Kenya or returned to any other 
country or be subjected to any similar measure if, as a result of such refusal, 
expulsion, return or other measure, such person is compelled to return to or 
remain in a country where a) the person may be subject to persecution on ac-
count of race, sex, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion; or b) the person’s life, physical integrity or liberty 
would be threatened on account of external aggression, occupation, foreign 
domination or events seriously disturbing public order in part or whole of 
that country.  2) The benefit of the provision of this section may not be availa-
ble to a refugee or an asylum seeker where there are reasonable grounds for 
regarding such a refugee or asylum seeker as a danger to the security of Ken-
ya.”) (emphasis added).  
90  See, e.g., The Refugee Act, § 28(a)(ii) (1998) (Tanz.) (discussing “depor-
tation” instead of expulsion); Loi No. 2000-019 portant statut des réfugiés au 
Togo, art. 27 (2000) (Togo) ; The Refugee Proclamation, art. 10.2 (2004) 
(Eth.); The Refugees Act, art. 40 (2006) (Uganda); The Sierra Leone Refugees 
Protection Act, § 16.1 (2007).  
91The Refugee Act, (2011) § 17 (Kenya) (“Subject to section 16 and sub-
section (2) of this section, where the Cabinet Secretary considers the revoca-
tion of the refugee status of any person and the expulsion from Kenya of that 
person to be necessary on grounds of national security and public order, the 
Cabinet Secretary may, after consultation with the Cabinet Secretary re-
sponsible for matters relating to internal security, order the revocation of the 
refugee status and proceed to expel such a person or member of his family 
from Kenya.”).  
92 Samuel B. Tindifa, Refugees and Human Rights in Uganda: A Critical 
Assessment of the Law, Policy and Practice, 5 E. AFR. J. OF PEACE & HUM. RTS. 
53, 59 (1998) (“[I]ntegrating refugees into local communities has never been 
considered by the Ugandan authorities as a viable option. . . . This perception 
of the refugee question has led the Uganda Government to adopt measures 
aimed at tight control, segregation, ‘pacification’ and the depoliticization of 
refugees. . . . This practice marginalizes refugees.”); James Katalikawe, Help-
ing Refugees to Help Themselves: Uganda’s Response to the Refugee Crisis in 
the Great Lake Region, 8 E. AFR. J. OF PEACE AND HUM. RTS. 211, 212-13 
(2002) (“Kenya and Tanzania are violating the rights of refugees seeking asy-
lum in the two countries. . . . Xenophobia and anti-refugee sentiment among 
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asylum-seekers, for instance, were denied the right to seek asy-
lum in 2005.93  In addition, in 2001, Congolese individuals of 
Rwandan origin were denied the right to seek asylum in 
Rwanda because they were considered Congolese (despite hav-
ing been chased from Congo because of their Rwandan herit-
age).94  Zimbabwean asylum-seekers “historically” go through 
many problems in order to obtain asylum in South Africa, 95 a 
country that as of 2012 continues in its refoulement of genuine 
refugees. 96  
To highlight the difficulty of enjoying a presumptive right 
to asylum in practice, S.M. Tindifa called attention to the situ-
ation in Uganda: 
Many of th[e] rights [provided in the 1951 Geneva and 1969 AU 
Conventions] are violated [in Uganda] [including] the following: 
                                                                                                             
East Africans have notably hardened. . . . Conditions for refugees are said to 
be significantly better in Uganda.  But . . . their treatment may worsen as 
Uganda negotiates with Kenya and Tanzania to standardize the refugee poli-
cies of all three nations.”).  
93 Uganda: rejection of Rwandan refugees, JESUIT REFUGEE SERVICES (Jul. 
15, 2005), http://www.jrs.net/news_detail?TN=NEWS-20100603110716 (“Ac-
cording to a statement on 3 July from the Uganda Office of the Prime Minis-
ter (OPM), 90% of Rwandan refugees have been rejected and will soon be 
asked to leave the country.  This follows an influx of between 1,300-1,500 ref-
ugees from Rwanda into Uganda in April and May 2005, most of whom were 
confined to living in the Nakivale settlement in Western Uganda without a 
decent place to stay, or food to eat.  The Ugandan government alleges that by 
confining refugees to this one site, it would prevent double registration.”). 
94 JRS Dispatches No. 86: Congolese Refugees Rejected by Congo and 
Rwanda, RELIEFWEB (Feb. 3, 2001), http://reliefweb.int/node/75687 (“JRS 
Grands Lacs reports that 146 Congolese people of Rwandan ethnic origin ar-
rived in Kiziba camp, western Rwanda, after they were sent out of Congo and 
later rejected as Rwandans in Kigali.  In June last year, some 800 Congolese 
people of Rwandan ethnic origin living in Kinshasa were placed in a camp for 
security reasons.  In September, the government allegedly sent 146 of them 
to Rwanda.  The people arrived in Kigali, where they were told they are not 
Rwandan and rejected.”).  
95 See Zimbabweans face uphill struggle in search for asylum in South 
Africa, UNHCR (July 11, 2008), http://www.unhcr.org/48776e934.html 
96 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2012: SOUTH AFRICA (2012), 
available at http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-2012-south-
africa (“Some South African officials indicated that the country was consider-
ing moving refugee reception offices to its borders with Mozambique and 
Zimbabwe and detaining all asylum seekers while their cases were being con-
sidered.  Local civil society voiced concerns this would bring chaos and possi-
bly a humanitarian crisis to the South Africa-Zimbabwe border area in par-
ticular and lead to a sharp deterioration of already poor decision-making, 
which would likely lead to increased refoulement of genuine refugees.”). 
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the right to life; the right to equal treatment, education and 
naturalization; freedom of expression, association and worship; 
freedom of movement; the right to gainful employment; the right 
against refoulement.97 
It should be noted, however, that according to UNHCR, the sit-
uation in Uganda is slowly improving in favor of more concrete 
protection for refugees,98 although the concerns caused by the 
aforementioned national law discriminating against homosex-
uals remain.   
Since the right to seek and enjoy asylum is often con-
strained in Africa, it is not surprising that there is little evi-
dence on the continent of its existence.  And unfortunately, Af-
rican shortcomings can be easily demonstrated through 
numerous inexplicable examples such South Africa’s refusal to 
grant asylum to the fifty Ethiopians in 2000.99  South Africa 
continues to this day to turn away asylum-seekers,100 as evi-
denced by the increasing refoulement of homosexuals occurring 
in recent years.101       
Not surprisingly, ExCom has finally stressed that the cred-
ibility of the institution of asylum can be seriously affected 
when states promptly return those improperly found to lack a 
                                                 
97 Tindifa, supra note 92, at 60.  
98 See Vanessa Akello, Uganda’s progressive Refugee Act becomes opera-
tional, UNHCR (June 22, 2009), http://www.unhcr.org/4a3f9e076.html (“‘Asy-
lum seekers have been accorded a very good law, which embodies some of the 
best regional tenets on refugee law,’ said Stefano Severe, UNHCR’s repre-
sentative in Uganda.  The legislation clearly enumerates the rights of refu-
gees, as well as their obligations in Uganda.  It defines who is a refugee and 
it is gender sensitive.  The law outlines the process to be used in determining 
refugee status.  It also sets forth how a refugee situation can cease, once du-
rable solutions have been found.  The freedoms enshrined in the law include 
the right to work, freedom of movement and the right to live in settlements 
rather than in refugee camps.  Prime Minister Nsibambi noted that refugees 
‘are given opportunity to fend for themselves by growing crops, attain food 
security and avail themselves of other human basic needs.’  The Ugandan 
leader stressed that the Refugee Act 2006 ‘epitomizes Uganda’s unwavering 
liberal policy towards refugees who seek protection here until they feel it is 
safe for them to return to their countries of origin.’”). 
99 JESUIT REFUGEE SERV., SOUTHERN AFRICA ANNUAL REPORT 43 (2000).  
100 See AFRICA: Horn migrants heading south “pushed backwards.” IRIN 
AFRICA (Aug. 2, 2011), http://www.irinnews.org/Report/93403/AFRICA-Horn-
migrants-heading-south-pushed-backwards.  
101 See Paul Canning, Is South Africa increasingly refusing gay asylum 
seekers?, CARE2 (Nov. 6, 2011, 6:00 PM), http://www.care2.com/causes/is-
south-africa-increasingly-refusing-gay-asylum-seekers.html. 
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necessity for such inter-state protection.102  As the African sit-
uation demonstrates, however, the problem starts before indi-
viduals found not to deserve protection are repatriated.  Ra-
ther, the problem lies within the concept of asylum itself: it 
derives from a lack of unanimously recognized standards allow-
ing all aliens to effectively seek asylum.  
Given the foregoing, there might be an alternative solution 
by granting asylum as a right though domestic African law.  In 
several African constitutions,103 the right of granting asylum 
could become, in the near future, local customary law104 within 
SSA.  Some African officials, in particular former President of 
Botswana, Q.K.J. Masire, have indicated support for local cus-
tom by arguing that the granting of asylum should be a “moral 
duty.”105  
There is no reasonable basis for expecting the emergence of 
a local African custom on the right of granting asylum, howev-
er.  Custom is composed of a subjective element (opinio juris 
sive necessitatis) and an objective element (state practice).  If 
we agree that the opinio juris of granting asylum in Africa, like 
                                                 
102 United Nations High Comm’r for Refugees, Exec. Comm., Conclusion 
on the Return of Persons Found Not to be in Need of International Protection, 
¶ b, U.N. Doc. A/58/12/Add.1 (Oct. 10, 2003).  
103 See CONSTITUTION DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE DU RWANDA Jun. 4, 2003, art. 25 
(Rwanda) (“Le droit d’asile est reconnu dans les conditions définies par la loi. 
L’extradition des étrangers n’est autorisée que dans les limites prévues par la 
loi ou les conventions internationales auxquelles le Rwanda est partie.  
Toutefois, aucun Rwandais ne peut être extrude.”); see also CONSTITUTION DE 
LA RÉPUBLIQUE DÉMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO Feb. 18, 2006, art. 33 (Dem. Rep. 
Congo); CONSTITUTION DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE DU BURUNDI Feb. 22, 2005, art. 23 
(Burundi); CONSTITUTION DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE DE CÔTE D'IVOIRE Aug. 1, 2000, 
art. 12 (Côte d’Ivoire); CONSTITUTION DU BURKINA FASO Jun. 11, 1991, art. 9 
(Burk. Faso); LA CONSTITUTION DU MALI Mar. 26, 1991, art. 12 (Mali) (“Nul ne 
peut être contraint à l'exil.  Toute personne persécutée en raison de ses con-
victions politiques ou religieuses, de son appartenance ethnique, peut bé-
néficier du droit d'asile en République du Mali.”). 
104 Hugh Thirlway, The Sources of International Law, in INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 125 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2006) (“[A]longside general customary law 
there exists rule of special or local customary law, which are applicable only 
within a defined group of States; and it is in principle possible for a State 
which does not accept a rule which is in the process becoming standard inter-
national practice to make clear its opposition to it, in which case it will be ex-
empted from the rule when it does become a rule of law, having the status of 
what is generally called a persistent objector.”) (emphasis added). 
105 Tiyanjana Maluwa, The Concept of Asylum and the Protection of Refu-
gees in Botswana: Some Legal and Political Aspects, 2 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 
587, 594 (1990). 
246      PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE COMPANION [Vol.  3::5 
elsewhere in the world, does not exist,106 then we must be very 
sceptical of the existence of a customary right of granting asy-
lum simply based on the actions of state agents.107   
State practice is comprised of general and consistent ele-
ments.  But while “[a] practice can be general even if it is not 
universally followed[,] there is no precise formula to indicate 
how widespread a practice must be . . . [because practice is ana-
lyzed with respect to the level of] acceptance among the states 
particularly involved in the relevant activity.”108  It is the term 
“consistent” that has left scholars with more than some doubt 
as to the application of a custom of granting asylum in Africa.  
On this basis, in spite of the efforts by national legislators to 
introduce the right of granting asylum as a constitutional prin-
ciple, the practice is still too inconsistent to consider the grant-
ing of asylum a veritable local custom in SSA. 
III. IS THE CONCEPT OF TEMPORARY PROTECTION AN “EMPTY 
BOX” IN AFRICA?  
Because the requirements of full asylum are sometimes too 
demanding for states to comply with, a new concept has recent-
ly started to creep into the asylum conversation; “temporary 
protection.”109  Temporary protection prohibits a state from for-
cibly repatriating foreign nationals who find themselves within 
its territory.110  It has broadened from an assurance given to 
individuals fleeing violence and instability caused by armed 
conflict within their state of citizenship to include individuals 
fleeing from other situations like natural disasters, which are 
                                                 
106 I personally find it difficult to understand how some scholars find that 
the granting of asylum is not effected in contemplation of a legal obligation. 
107 BARRY E. CARTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 124 (5th ed. 2007) (“For a 
practice of states to become a rule of customary international law it must ap-
pear that the states follow the practice from a sense of legal obligation; . . . a 
practice that is generally followed but which states feel legally free to disre-
gard does not contribute to customary international law.”).  
108 Id. 
109 Kennedy, supra note 60, at 65 (“The debate about what has been 
termed ‘temporary refuge’ frankly acknowledges what it sees as an inevitable 
disjuncture between the international legal exhortations of international in-
stitutions and the practice of national politics.”). 
110 See United Nations High Comm’r for Refugees, Dept. of Int’l Protec-
tion, Legal Protection Policy Research Series: Protection Mechanism Outside 
of the 1951 Convention (“Complimentary Protection”), U.N. Doc. PPLA/2005/2 
(June 2005) (by Ruma Mandal) [hereinafter Complimentary Protection].  
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common in SSA.111  
In Article 2(5) of the final draft of the 1969 AU Convention, 
African legislators provided that where an asylum-seeker has 
not received the right of residence in any state of asylum, he 
may be granted at least temporary residence in the country of 
asylum in which he first presented himself, pending arrange-
ments for his possible resettlement elsewhere.112  The verb 
“may,” however, indicates that this provision is not a binding 
obligation, but a derivation of the principle of non-refoulement, 
which states that an asylum-seeker must be provisionally ad-
mitted if, in the case of the denial of the right of entry, he is 
obliged to remain in or to return to a country where he has a 
“well-founded fear of being persecuted.”113  Where asylum-
seekers should physically live during their stay in the host 
country is still debated, even if the prevailing practice is to use 
“detention centers.”114     
The norm of temporary protection, considered custom-
ary,115 was created “at the intersection of refugee law, humani-
                                                 
111  See Richard Black, Environmental Refugees: Myth or Reality? 1-2 
(Univ. of Sussex, Working Paper No. 34, 2001) (noting that human movement 
and natural disasters have led to the development of “three sub-categories of 
environmental refugee, namely temporary displacement due to temporary 
environmental stress; permanent displacement due to permanent environ-
mental change; and temporary or permanent displacement due to progressive 
degradation of the resource base.”).  For instance, floods have recently struck 
Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Mozambique.  See Burundi: Floods displace 
thousands north of Bujumbura, REFWORLD (Apr. 14, 2009), http://www. un-
hcr.org/refworld/docid/49e6ef2cc.html; Thousands more displaced as floods 
spread, REFWORLD (Aug. 27, 2009), http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/ ref-
ref-
world/rwmain?page=search&amp;docid=48b7acaf1c&amp;skip=0&amp;query
=floods; Floods displace thousands in northeast, REFWORLD (Oct. 16, 2008), 
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?page=search&amp;d 
ocid=48fd88ab9&amp;skip=0&amp;query=floods; Amenesty International Re-
port 2004 – Mozambique, REFWORLD, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/r 
ef-
world/rwmain?page=search&amp;docid=40b5a1fcc&amp;skip=0&amp;query=
floods&amp;querysi=Mozambique&amp;searchin=title&amp;display=10&am
p;sort=relevance (last visited Oct. 7, 2011).    
112 See 1969 AU Convention, supra note 5, art. 2(5). 
113 Weis, supra note 51, at 458 (paraphrasing Article 1(1) of the 1969 AU 
Convention). 
114 Kuruk, Asylum and the Non-Refoulement of Refugees, supra note 36, 
at 339. 
115 Deborah Perluss & Joan F. Hartman, Temporary Refuge: Emergence 
of a Customary Norm, 26 VA J. INT’L L. 551, 553 (1986).  
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tarian law, and human rights law.”116  It has particular im-
portance on the African continent because, although it does not 
contain anything intrinsically that prevents its application to 
individuals, it is usually “used to describe a short-term emer-
gency response to a significant influx of asylum seekers,”117 a 
phenomenon which has been sadly prevalent in SSA.118   
It is not by chance that the expanded definition of “refu-
gee” provided in the 1969 AU Convention,119 which seems to 
support the implementation of a norm regarding explicit tem-
porary protection,120 has been considered a fundamental basis 
                                                 
116 JANE MCADAM, COMPLEMENTARY PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL 
REFUGEE LAW 42 (2007).  
117 Complimentary Protection, supra note 110, at 3.  Joan Fitzpatrick 
doubts, however, the formalization of temporary protection because though 
“it might fill an important legal lacuna,” it “might appear to support ques-
tionable interpretations of existing treaty obligations.”  Joan Fitzpatrick, 
Temporary Protection of Refugees: Elements of a Formalized Regime, 94 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 279, 296 (2000).  
118 Fitzpatrick, supra note 117, at 282.  In the last decade, generally fol-
lowing civil or international wars, mass-influxes of asylum-seekers have oc-
curred on the continent in countries such as Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Soma-
lia, Rwanda, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Angola.  See, e.g., 
U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Assistance to Ref-
ugees, Returnees, and Displaced Persons in Africa, delivered to the General 
Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/54/414 (Sept. 29, 1999). 
119 The expanded definition of the African Convention refers to Article 
1(2) of the African Convention, which enlarges the definition provided in the 
1951 Geneva Convention by stating: “The term refugee shall also apply to 
every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domina-
tion or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of 
his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual 
residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin 
or nationality.”  1969 AU Convention, supra note 5, art. 1(2) (emphasis add-
ed); see also Fitzpatrick, supra note 117, at 293 (observing that “the definition 
of refugee [under the AU Convention] . . . was expanded to embrace war vic-
tims and other groups, without any suggestion that the quality or durability 
of their protection should be diminished as compared to that enjoyed by per-
sons meeting the definition in the 1951 Convention.”); Kuruk, Asylum and 
the Non-Refoulement of Refugees, supra note 36, at 324-25 (noting the “defini-
tion calls for an objective inquiry into the conditions prevailing in the refu-
gee’s country of origin, it is better suited for mass movements of refugees 
than the subjective test in the 1951 Convention, because it would permit the 
granting of refugee status to groups of refugees without necessarily subject-
ing each person to individual screening.”).   
120 Kay Hailbronner, Nonrefoulement and “Humanitarian” Refugees: Cus-
tomary International Law or Wishful Legal Thinking?, in THE NEW ASYLUM 
SEEKERS: REFUGEE LAW IN THE 1980S 135 (David A. Martin, ed., 1986).  A.M. 
Rifaat is clearer on this issue, contending that “[s]ignatory states [of the 1969 
AU Convention] were also urged to grant temporary asylum to refugees even 
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for transitory protection outside the African continent.   
UNHCR has even opined that “an OAU refugee Convention 
writ large” is the most attractive option to international codifi-
cation of complementary protection, with the concept of tempo-
rary protection serving as its foundation.121  In addition, tem-
porary residence is unequivocally referred to in Article 2(5) of 
the AU Convention,122 providing that the refugee does not have 
the right to be a resident in any other state of asylum.  Tempo-
rary residence, thus, seems to have left more room for denial 
than if the phrase “has not resided in” had been chosen.123   
On the other hand, the AU Convention has already served 
as a legal basis for a number of states in SSA to provide tempo-
rary protection to nationals of neighbouring countries who have 
fled violence or civil strife, even if exceptions apply.  For exam-
ple, in the past Ghana and Nigeria typically did not grant an 
individual the right to rely on the extended definition of refu-
gee provided in the 1969 AU Convention.124  But now, Ghana is 
one of the few examples in SSA of a country that is taking con-
crete steps to comply with its international legal obligations in 
terms of refugee protection.125  Moreover, Nigeria currently is 
hosting Liberian and Sierra Leonean refugees pursuant to the 
1969 AU Convention,126 and the national procedures it uses for 
                                                                                                             
when they feel that they cannot grant them permanent asylum.”  Rifaat, su-
pra note 56, at 106 (relying on Article 2(5) of the AU Convention); see also 
1969 AU Convention, supra note 5, art. 1. 
121 MCADAM, supra note 116, at 47. 
122 1969 AU Convention, supra note 5, art. 2(5) (“[W]here a refugee has 
not received the right to reside in any country of asylum, he may be granted 
temporary residence in any country of asylum in which he first presented 
himself as a refugee pending arrangement for his resettlement.”).   
123 W.J.E.M. Van Hövell tot Westerflier, supra note 49, at 176. 
124 Hailbronner, supra note 120, at 135. 
125 UNHCR, Submission by the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights’ Compilation Report - Universal Periodic Review: Ghana 1, (2012), 
available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4f7867ff2.html.  
126 Multipartite Agreement for the Local Integration of Liberian and Si-
erra Leonean Refugees in Nigeria between the Government of the Republic of 
Liberia, the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone, the Government of 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS), and the Office of The United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR), Jun. 2007, available at http://www.unhcr.org/49 
e479ca22.pdf (“11) Liberian and Sierra Leonean refugees opting to locally in-
tegrate in  Nigeria will acknowledge that by accepting passports issued to 
them by their respective countries of origin they are voluntarily re-availing 
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the status determination are in large part effected pursuant to 
the 1969 AU Convention.127    
Temporary protection is often associated with the effective 
sharing of responsibilities, and sometimes involves the physical 
transfer of asylum-seekers and structured schemes for finan-
cial assistance for states of refuge.  This objective may be re-
sisted by African states seeking to avoid creating a legal com-
mitment to be safe havens and by refugee advocates who fear 
the commoditization of refugee protection.   
It often happens, however, that asylum, initially granted 
as a temporary measure, can be transformed into a permanent 
condition, especially when the refugee’s stay in the host coun-
try lasts decades and it becomes difficult to control all of his 
movements.128  A typical example of this situation involves the 
Angolans who have been provided with temporary protection 
by DRC officials since Angola’s civil conflict in 1975, but have 
never been repatriated.129   
Nonetheless, there are a few exceptions to this general rule 
as evidenced by the Rwandans return to their home in the mid-
1990s from Uganda where they were “temporarily” protected 
since 1959,130 the Burundians, repatriated from Tanzania dur-
                                                                                                             
themselves of the protection of those countries.  Their status as refugees will 
thus cease in accordance with Article 1C (1) of the 1951 Convention and the 
corresponding provisions of Nigerian law.  12) The loss of refugee status 
through re-availment does not preclude a new claim to recognition as a refu-
gee, including on a sur place basis, should conditions arise justifying such 
recognition under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees or 
the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Prob-
lems in Africa.”). 
127 L.H. Gumi & K. Zannah, Refugee Status Determination Procedure in 
Nigeria, IARLJ, http://www.iarlj.org/general/images/stories/wp_papers_cape_ 
town/refugee_status_dertmination_procedure_in_nigeria.pdf (last visited May 
2, 2012).  
128 Okogbule, supra note 49, at 188 (“[T]he problem . . . is that the longer 
a refugee stays in a country of asylum, the more he or she acquires rights and 
interests which are at variance with the continuing grant of the temporary 
status of a refugee.  For instance, a refugee may get married to a national of 
the asylum-granting country . . . and yet by law remain a refugee.  The ques-
tion then arises, under those circumstances, when can it be said that his or 
her refugee status has ended?”). 
129 Cf. UNHCR, Angola 296 (2007) (“[T]he year 2006 also saw UNHCR, 
for the first time, assisting thousands of spontaneously settled Angolans in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to return home.”). 
130 Fitzpatrick, supra note 117, at 293.  It is important to point out that 
refugees were historically perceived as a temporary problem in Uganda, 
which considered its territory mainly a transit point for them.  See Tindifa, 
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ing September 2009, where they had been living “temporarily” 
since 1972,131 and the 24,000 Mauritanians repatriated in 
March 2012 from Senegal and Mali, where they were “tempo-
rarily” protected since late 1980s, early 1990s.132 
Even in recent years, however, South African authorities 
have denied temporary protection to asylum-seekers from Zim-
babwe.133  This inconsistency, a recurrent trait regarding the 
application of refugee law in Africa, is explained in the follow-
ing statement: 
South Africa’s very recent inclination to provide a special tem-
porary residence permit to Zimbabweans (one that will legalize 
their stay for a short period of time and allow them to work in 
the interim) will hopefully fill the gap in South Africa’s law . . . . 
[S]uch a permit would not only promote the legal entry of Zim-
babweans into South Africa at a port of entry, but at the same 
time it will serve a much greater purpose - formulating a policy 
for socio-economic migrants who are facing a humanitarian cri-
sis which will ensure that refugee protection is not being erod-
ed.134  
It is important to note that the 1997 South African Draft Green 
Paper on International Migration contained several recom-
                                                                                                             
supra note 92, at 56;  cf. H.R. Garry, Applying the “Plumb Line” of Uganda’s 
Bill of Rights: Human Rights and the Draft Bill of Refugees, 5 E. AFR. J. 
PEACE & HUMAN RTS. 64, 71 (1998) (“[R]efugees should not be seen as only re-
quiring temporary protection [in Uganda]. . . . Rather, refugees should be 
seen as persons entitled to durable and permanent solutions to their problem 
of protection.”). 
131 Edwin Seleli & Eveline Wolfcarius, Repatriation of 1972 Burundian 
Refugees Hits 50,000 Mark, UNHCR (Sept. 16, 2009), http://www.unhcr.or 
g/4ab0db636.html. 
132 UNHCR completes repatriation of more than 24,000 Mauritanians, 
UNHCR (Mar. 27, 2012), http://www.unhcr.org/4f71f54c6.html.  
133JRS Dispatches No. 222: South Africa: No Temporary Shelter for Zim-
babweans, RELIEFWEB (Sept. 14, 2007), http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.in 
t/files/reliefweb_pdf/node-243580.pdf (“[I]nconsistencies have clouded what 
could be new thinking in the department.  Home Affairs Director-General 
Mavuso Msimang said assisting Zimbabwean asylum seekers was not among 
his department’s priorities.”). 
134 Tal Hanna Schreier, A Critical Examination of South Africa's Applica-
tion of the Expanded OAU Refugee Definition: Is Adequate Protection Being 
Offered Within the Meaning of the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention? 59-60 
(Feb. 2008) (unpublished LL.M thesis, University of Cape Town) (citing Fat-
ima Khan, Patterns and Policies of Migration in South Africa: Changing Pat-
terns and the Need for a Comprehensive Approach 10-11 (Univ. of Cape Town 
Law Clinic, Discussion Paper, 2007)), available at http://srvrhldig001. 
uct.ac.za:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=1298&local_base=GEN01.  
252      PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE COMPANION [Vol.  3::5 
mendations pertaining to a separate and stand-alone piece of 
refugee legislation in South Africa, which should: 
Be based on a model of refugee protection that is rights-based, so-
lution-oriented, with the sharing of the burden across all SADC 
member states.  The objective of the model is to provide temporary 
protection to persons whose basic human rights are at risk in 
their country of origin.135 
As a matter of fact, it remains doubtful whether the 1969 
AU Convention really does lend support to the supposition that 
a civil right of temporary protection can be considered regional 
customary international law.  The practice of contracting states 
in cases of the mass-influx of individuals is far from certain.136   
In addition, critics of temporary protection have argued that if 
it is to be pragmatic or grounded in the host state’s capacity to 
comply, it corrupts the obligation of non-refoulement.137  These 
critics argue that if temporary protection were binding, it 
would threaten the discretionary character of asylum, especial-
ly if the international burden of sharing the responsibility for 
refugees cannot be established with equal normative and prac-
tical force.138  Critics and defenders of temporary protection 
alike rely upon the proposition that temporary protection is dif-
ferent from both refugee law and asylum.  As such, the debate 
about the validity of the notion of temporary protection ulti-
mately circles back to the endless debate on the right to asylum 
and non-refoulement.139        
IV. FINAL REFLECTIONS ON THE INSTITUTION OF ASYLUM IN 
AFRICA 
The 1994 OAU/UNHCR Symposium observed that the in-
stitution of asylum in Africa was under stress: 
[Th]e large number of refugees seeking asylum in countries al-
ready themselves experiencing tremendous social and economic 
hardships, has brought into question the very capacity of na-
tions to cope with refugees.  In a number of countries, the basic 
                                                 
135 Id. at 32-33 (emphasis added) (emphasis omitted) (citing DR. WILMOT 
G. JAMES, GREEN PAPER: INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION (1997), available at 
http://www.queensu.ca/samp/Green.pdf). 
136 Hailbronner, supra note 120, at 135. 
137 Kennedy, supra note 60, at 67. 
138 Id. 
139 Id.   
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principles of refugee protection are not being upheld. Refugees 
have been arrested and detained without charge.  Others have 
been resumed [sic] against their will to places where their lives 
may be in danger.  Yet others have been restricted to refugee 
camps or to remote, inaccessible locations where they are some-
times exposed to banditry, rape and other forms of criminality.  
Many have not been able to enjoy social, economic and civil 
rights.140  
Ten years later, the African Parliamentary Conference, held in 
Cotonou under the auspices of UNHCR and ICRC, reaffirmed 
the importance of maintaining the civilian and humanitarian 
character of asylum, as set up in article II of the 1969 AU Con-
vention through, among other aspects:  
Encourag[ing] the competent authorities in countries facing 
mixed movements of refugees and armed elements to adopt pro-
grammes for the disarmament of these armed elements and the 
identification, separation and internment of combatants, seek-
ing technical assistance and additional resources from the in-
ternational community, where required [and] [e]ncourag[ing] 
the United Nations and sub-regional organizations to ensure 
that programs aimed at integrating former armed elements in 
post-conflict situations are adequately funded, so as to contrib-
ute to sustainable peace and security.141  
The most evident peculiarity in the concepts of both tem-
porary protection and asylum tout court in the African conti-
nent is the presence of a plain inconsistency between the writ-
ten norm and its application.  Put simply, African legislators 
and officials produce inconsistent written norms that do not 
always take into consideration the real situation in the field or, 
more often, demonstrate their incoherence by not applying de 
facto the international and national provisions contained in le-
gal instruments, thereby unwillingly promoting the “legal emp-
tiness of the norm.”142  In my opinion, African legislators and 
officials behave very coherently in the face of this seeming in-
                                                 
140 Org. of African Unity, supra note 46, ¶ 13. 
141 African Parliamentary Conference, Cotonou, Benin, June 1-3, 2004, 
Refugees In Africa: The Challenges of Protection and Solutions, available at 
http://www.ipu.org/splz-e/cotonou.htm. 
142 Cf. Michael H. Shapiro, Lawyers, Judges and Bioethics, 5 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 113, 155 (1997) (“One claim may be that defending certain in-
terests and even discussing certain topics reflect moral indifference and cause 
harm, at least if outrage is not expressed by the discussants. . . . The ‘empti-
ness’ of law is reflected in its unthinking and offensive detachment.”).   
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coherence.  
The 1969 AU Convention recognizes the special need in Af-
rica for refugee protection within the legal framework.  While 
the 1969 AU Convention has provided a legal framework for 
better protection of the refugee, its benefits have been eroded 
away by the conflicts that still devastate several areas in Afri-
ca.  Although the African Convention advanced the progressive 
development of international law by codifying major principles 
of refugee law, international cooperation remains the main 
principle of the convention and has been the keystone in the 
protection of refugees on the African continent.143  Moreover, a 
serious defect in the 1951 Geneva Convention was its failure to 
guarantee a right of asylum to the individual, an omission that, 
in a sense, renders the rights of the refugee provided under in-
ternational law useless.  Finally, both the regional and the uni-
versal conventions have been considered quite vague in their 
terminology.144     
Since the Second World War, there have been considerable 
developments in international cooperation, a greater emphasis 
upon fairness, equity, and humanitarianism in international 
law, as well as a growing recognition of the concept of the in-
ternational community as a society of individuals with an obli-
gation to ensure that all of its members are given the right to 
live in dignity and safety.145  This latter notion has been af-
firmed by domestic courts in Africa.  In Minister of Home Af-
fairs v. Watchenuka, a South African court wrote: “[h]uman 
dignity has no nationality.  It is inherent in all people—citizens 
and non-citizens alike—simply because they are human.”146 
Nonetheless, it is true that, today in Africa, states consist-
ently refuse to accept binding obligations to grant aliens any 
rights to asylum in the form of permanent rights to settle.  Af-
rican states have been resolute in maintaining that the ques-
tion of whether or not a right of entry should be afforded to an 
individual or to a group of individuals is something that each 
country must resolve for itself.147 
                                                 
143 Mukira-Nyanduga, supra note 53, at 104.  
144 Kuruk, Refugeeism, supra note 30, at 227. 
145 Hyndman, Refugees Under International Law, supra note 34, at 155. 
146 Minister of Home Affairs v. Watchenuka  2003 (1) SA 21 (SCA) at ¶ 25 
(S. Afr). 
147 S. PRAKASH SINHA, ASYLUM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 218 (1971).   
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